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ABSTRACT
Integrity and security of the data in database systems are
typically maintained with access control policies and fire-
walls. However, insider attacks – where someone with an
intimate knowledge of the system and administrative priv-
ileges tampers with the data – pose a unique challenge.
Measures like append only logging prove to be insufficient
because an attacker with administrative privileges can alter
logs and login records to eliminate the trace of attack, thus
making insider attacks hard to detect.
In this paper, we propose Verity – first of a kind system to
the best of our knowledge. Verity serves as a dataless frame-
work by which any blockchain network can be used to store
fixed-length metadata about tuples from any SQL database,
without complete migration of the database. Verity uses a
formalism for parsing SQL queries and query results to check
the respective tuples’ integrity using blockchains to detect
insider attacks. We have implemented our technique us-
ing Hyperledger Fabric, Composer REST API, and SQLite
database. Using TPC-H data and SQL queries of varying
complexity and types, our experiments demonstrate that
any overhead of integrity checking remains constant per tu-
ple in a query’s results, and scales linearly.
1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional integrity constraints in a relational database
system (DBMS) involve ensuring the integrity of tuples ac-
cording to predefined constraints such as foreign key con-
straints, data types of attribute values, etc. Another aspect
of integrity stems from malicious tampering of the tuples
in a DBMS. Typically this data integrity is ensured with
access control policies and firewalls. With access control
policies, only selected few users of a DBMS are given ad-
ministrative privileges. Firewalls ensure that an outsider
cannot get direct access to the DBMS server. However, an
insider attack is where a privileged user, e.g., an adminis-
trator, misuses the privileges to gain access to or tamper
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with the data. As reported in the recent 2017 and 2018 sur-
veys [4, 5, 15, 31], about 30% of organizations face insider
attacks and a staggering 55–60% of the attackers are priv-
ileged users or administrators. Among the assets that are
most at risk, “database systems” top the list with 50–57%
of the insider attacks on them. The surveys conjecture that
the topmost reason for insider attacks is “insufficient data
protection strategies”. The surveys further point out that
90% of organizations feel vulnerable to insider threats, and
insider attacks remain the most difficult to detect. Thus,
insider attack has become a non-trivial and non-negligible
issue in protecting the data integrity in a DBMS.
Insider attacks can be passive or active. Passive attacks
involve unethical access and use of the data, while active
attacks involve tampering with the data and logs, to alter
the results of queries. A simple yet illuminating example of
the second type of attack is tampering with academic grade
records, and it has been reported multiple times in the recent
past [3, 6, 7, 13]. Some countries like India have adopted
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) for elections, avoiding
paper ballots. An EVM has an embedded DBMS inside
it, and each vote serves as a transaction. These EVMs are
also vulnerable to insider attacks and tampering [8, 11, 18].
The traditional databases have come a long way over the
past several decades in efficient, diverse, and scalable data
storage solutions. SQL query optimization and processing
along with the modern hardware has efficiently tackled the
“memory-wall”. However, as noted above, the new age chal-
lenges are security and integrity of the data, and detection
and prevention of insider attacks forms a critical component.
On the other hand, blockchain is an emerging technol-
ogy for decentralized data storage with strong guarantees
of immutability and tamper resistance. Blockchains can
be considered analogous to append only logs in a native
DBMS. However, in an insider attack, the attacker with
administrative privileges can alter logs and login records
to remove proof of data tampering. One straight-forward
solution could be to push all the databases on blockchain
frameworks. Indeed, there have already been efforts in this
direction. E.g., BigchainDB [9] integrates Tendermint [20,
44] with MongoDB [17] (a NoSQL database), and provides
a high transaction rate. However, it supports only decen-
tralized blockchain based data management eco-system and
supports only MongoDB’s querying interface. LedgerDB
[16] is another blockchain based database, which supports
high transaction throughput. However, LedgerDB supports
only a single table and does not support various SQL fea-
tures. ChainDB by Bitpay Inc [10] is another such solution,
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but it focuses on bitcoin transactions, than providing a gen-
eral purpose DBMS solution. Most blockchain frameworks,
as well as blockchain powered DBMSs, do not provide a rich
SQL querying interface that is common to a modern DBMS.
Additionally, there is a growing concern for data privacy in
pushing the existing data on the public blockchain networks
[1].
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are analytical systems
that focus on user profiling for suspicious activity detec-
tion, e.g., sudden large financial transactions, user logins
from irregular locations, transactions non-compliant with
the DBMS policies etc [30, 27, 41, 51, 45, 38, 26]. An IDS
will not necessarily detect an insider attack if the attack
does not violate its analytical modelling and user-profiling
framework rules, e.g., a DBMS administrator illegitimately
modifying or inserting a few tuples in a DBMS may not
come under IDS radar if there is no perceived irregularity of
the behaviour.
On this background, we propose a solution to detect in-
sider attacks in a DBMS. The primary contribution of this
paper is Verity, that acts as a framework facilitating use of
any blockchain with any SQL DBMS (centralized or dis-
tributed). It uses the data immutability of blockchains,
along with the rich SQL interface of a DBMS, without re-
quiring to migrate entire data, or adopting a new query in-
terface or language. The main novelty of Verity lies in our
detailed algorithmic and protocol framework to handle a va-
riety of CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) SQL queries
by supporting a large part of the SQL grammar – specifi-
cally the queries having nested SELECT clauses and joins over
multiple tables (Section 3, Section 3.2). Verity layer in it-
self does not store any data or metadata about data, thus
maintaining data privacy. It facilitates identification of il-
legitimate data tampering whenever the tampered data is
accessed in an SQL query evaluation. This in turn helps to
stop any cascade effect of the tampered data affecting crit-
ical decisions based on it, e.g., academic grades, financial
accounting etc1. Our solution also allows the flexibility of
enabling or disabling the blockchain-based integrity check-
ing in a plug-and-play fashion. We have implemented Verity
using web-based SQL interface, Hyperledger Fabric [14], its
Composer REST API [2], and SQLite database [19]. Since
Verity is a framework facilitating the use of blockchains with
an SQL DBMS, for the scope of this paper, we have not
focused on the aspects of performance optimization for in-
creasing the system throughput, failure-recovery, or efficient
storage/indexing methods, because they are dependent on
individual blockchain and DBMS platforms. However, our
experimental results on TPC-H data of varying scaling fac-
tor and SQL queries of varying complexity (Section 5, Ap-
pendix A) demonstrate that any overhead incurred by Ver-
ity’s integrity checking process remains constant per tuple in
the results of a query, and thus scales linearly. Also in Sec-
tion 4 we discuss the aspects of possible future throughput
optimizations.
2. PROBLEM SETTING
In this section, we discuss preliminaries about blockchain
framework, cryptographic hash functions, and data privacy,
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Prevention of an insider attack will require different artifacts for
interacting with the DBMS, and is not within the scope of the current
paper.
along with an overview of the attacker model and proposed
framework.
2.1 Blockchains
The concept of blockchains was introduced as a technol-
ogy powering a peer to peer digital currency, Bitcoin [46].
However, capabilities of blockchains go beyond cryptocur-
rencies, as it can be used as a decentralized data store with
strong cryptographic guarantees of tamper resistance. Con-
ceptually, a blockchain is a linked-list, where each node
in the list is called a block. Each block is cryptographi-
cally linked to the previous block, forming a continuously
growing chain of blocks. The first block is called Genesis
Block, which is known to all the blockchain participants,
and acts as a common reference for verifying the sanctity of
the blockchain. Each block after genesis may contain several
transactions and other metadata such as timestamp, block
height (distance from the Genesis Block) etc. Unlike a con-
ventional data storage or DBMS, blockchain has stronger
cryptographic guarantees, i.e., data once written in a block,
cannot be easily modified, and creation of a new block on
the chain requires consensus among blockchain peers. Any
roll-back of a transaction or erasure of data gets logged as
another transaction in a block, thus providing strong guar-
antees of data provenance (traceability).
In a blockchain, all the participants are peers. Identities
of these peers may be known or hidden, which makes two
broad categories of blockchains: (a) permissionless with hid-
den peer identities, and (b) permissioned with known peer
identities. Permissionless blockchains are more popular for
cryptocurrencies, where any peer can join the blockchain
network and participate in the consensus protocol. Permis-
sioned blockchains are more suitable for business applica-
tions, and they provide an alternate way of peer consen-
sus than permissionless blockchains. Among permissioned
blockchains, each may have different type of peer consensus.
In Verity, we have used Hyperledger Fabric [14]. However,
Verity by design is agnostic to any specific blockchain, and
if a different blockchain network is used, appropriate peer
consensus protocol will need to be implemented. For the
scope of this paper, we do not get into the details of peer
consensus algorithms, and refer the interested reader to the
relevant literature [46, 14].
However, we would like to make a note here that unlike
a conventional DBMS, where even a single administrator
or a small number of them colluding can tamper the data
and logs, in a blockchain, it requires collusion among a large
fraction of peers, making it a non-trivial process. We explain
this further in Section 2.2.
2.2 Attacker Model Assumptions
A DBMS has one or more administrators, and we as-
sume that an inside attacker has full access to the database
server with administrative privileges. Thus the administra-
tor/s can tamper with the data, and modify logs and login
records as well. A typical DBMS and its administrators
do not have a strong cryptographic peer consensus protocol
like blockchains to authorize a change. Any subset of the
administrators can pose a threat as inside attackers.
The goal of Verity is to detect an insider attack, so we
assume that the set of peers in a permissioned blockchain
that we use along with a DBMS, are not exactly same as the
respective database administrators. We also assume that, in
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a rare case, if the permissioned blockchain peers are same as
DBMS administrators, not all of them are colluding in an
insider attack. An insider attack that may go undetected for
a long time can jeopardize any decisions based on the tam-
pered data due to the cascading effect. In this scenario, we
also assume that in an organization, not all critical decision
makers are DBMS administrators – for the sake of fairness,
the three sets (1) blockchain peers, (2) DBMS administra-
tors, and (3) critical decision makers are not completely
overlapping one another – thus making collusion among a
large fraction of them less likely.
Our goal is to make tamper detection automatic, when-
ever the tampered data is accessed through SQL queries,
than relying on manual audit, and without involving any
specific privileged users. We also want tampering to be vis-
ible to anyone having access to the concerned data. In Sec-
tion 3 we demonstrate how we achieve this.
For the scope of Verity, we assume that administrators’ ac-
cess methods, such as private keys or passwords are secure.
Our attack model does not consider any application vulner-
ability or system vulnerability based attacks – we consider
that otherwise the database is not hacked – only a priv-
ileged user is tampering with the tuples. Note, however,
that since Verity uses blockchains to log changes and ver-
ify tuple integrity, as described further in this paper, even
data tampering done via hacking and bypassing blockchains
can be detected. Peer consensus makes logging an illegiti-
mate change on blockchain non-trivial, and adds traceability
to it. Any aggressive, active damage to the system such as
corrupting the hardware or physical theft of property is self-
evident, and will result in detection of the attack.
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
In the blockchain nodes we mainly store metadata about
tuples in a DBMS. This process is elaborated in Section 2.4.
In this section, we set the basic background of hash functions
used to generate this metadata.
Cryptographic hash functions [12, 37] map any data of ar-
bitrary length to a bit string of fixed length, called hash. A
hash function is given as: h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n where n is a
constant such as 128, 256, or 512. By design, cryptographic
hash functions are one-way functions, and it is computa-
tionally difficult to invert (a.k.a. break) them, to generate
the original data from a given hash. Also for two differ-
ent pieces of input data, the difference in their hash values
H1, H2 is not relative, and often a minor change in the input
value results in a drastic change in the output hash value.
Noting these properties of cryptographic hash functions, in
Verity we use SHA256 [37] to generate a unique fingerprint
of 256-bit for each tuple in the DBMS. This procedure is
elaborated in the next section.
2.4 Metadata about Data
In order to use a blockchain network with an existing
DBMS, without migrating the whole data on the blockchain,
we create metadata about data, and only store that on the
blockchain. This metadata is generated using the SHA256
cryptographic hash function for each tuple in a DBMS as
follows. We assume that each table has a primary key de-
fined on it2. For each tuple r in table T , we first generate
2If a table does not have a primary key, we can use row-number as
the primary key, or treat all the columns together as a composite
primary key.
RowID as:
RowIDr,T = h(PrimaryKey(r) · T )
That is we concatenate primary key of the tuple along with
the table name and generate a hash from it. Assuming that
the tuple has in all k columns, c1...ck , using the RowID
generated earlier, we generate fingerprint of the entire tuple
as follows:
fingerprintr = h(RowID · c1 · c2 · c3 · · · ck)
That is, we concatenate the RowID along with each column
value and generate another 256-bit hash from it. If an at-
tribute has a NULL value, we skip over that and concatenate
the next non-NULL valued attribute. This is specifically
done so that any change of a NULL value to a non-NULL
and vice versa can be detected through the change in the
fingerprint.
This fingerprint is then stored on a blockchain using dig-
ital signature (private key) of a blockchain peer, and after
passing the peer consensus protocol (ref. Section 2.1). Thus
every fingerprint of every tuple stored in a blockchain has an
owner (blockchain peer) of the transaction associated with
it. Any legitimate modifications to a tuple get logged on
the blockchain with a new fingerprint of the tuple along
with the digital signature of the respective owner. Any pre-
vious fingerprints of the modified tuple are also preserved in
the blockchain. Thus blockchain provides non-repudiation
on maintaining the number of legitimate tuple modifications
along with their owners. However, with hash based finger-
prints, the exact nature of modifications cannot be tracked
through blockchains. This is in order to honour data privacy
as discussed next.
2.5 Data Privacy
In our setting, the aforementioned fingerprint of each tu-
ple in a DBMS is pushed on the blockchain. Along with this,
we also store number of rows in each table on the blockchain.
Detailed handling of this metadata in the event of updates
is discussed in Section 3. Note that our method of storing
fingerprints preserves the privacy of the original data in a
DBMS, because from a fingerprint of a tuple, original at-
tribute values cannot be retrieved (ref. Section 2.3). We
trust that this is an important property of Verity system,
especially among the growing concern of data privacy in us-
ing public blockchain frameworks [1]. Thus with Verity, even
if a public blockchain framework is used for storing meta-
data, the original database values are never revealed on the
blockchain framework.
2.6 Detecting Tampering
Conceptually, working of Verity can be summarized as
follows:
1. We assume that at the very beginning the data in a
DBMS is clear from any tampering or existing attack.
2. We create a fingerprint for each tuple, and store this fin-
gerprint on the blockchain.
3. As given in Section 2.2, we assume that the same set of
DBMS administrators are not peers on the blockchain
network, and not all blockchain peers are colluding in an
attack.
4. Further we assume that a normal user does not have a
way to access/query the given DBMS by circumventing
3
Figure 1: Architecture and Communication Sequence
the Verity framework. Note that in Section 2.2, we have
clarified that in the context of Verity, we are not assuming
a hacker scenario, and private keys and passwords are
secure.
5. A well-intentioned DBMS administrator makes any up-
dates to the data through Verity, following the peer con-
sensus protocol, and the modification gets logged into
the blockchain. Each update that gets logged on the
blockchain has a digital signature of the peer submit-
ting the transaction. Thus for every blockchain update,
there is accountability, and number of modifications can
be traced through blockchain.
6. When an inside attacker tampers with the DBMS by cir-
cumventing Verity and in turn blockchain logging, the
tampering gets detected when the tampered tuples are
retrieved in an SQL query at a later time issued through
Verity’s interface.
Having summarized the overall concept and functioning
of Verity, next in Section 3, we elaborate on the detailed
architecture, and handling of SQL queries by taking into
consideration SQL grammar. We trust that this will fa-
cilitate the community to use the powerful features of any
commercial or opensource blockchain framework with any
SQL database, without having to migrate entirely to a new
system. This, in our opinion, will greatly help in faster de-
tection of insider attacks.
3. ARCHITECTURE
Three main components of the Verity framework are:
(a) A blockchain network,
(b) An SQL database, and
(c) An HTTP based web application connecting these two
that intercepts SQL queries for data integrity checks.
Blockchain network and SQL database can be any blockchain
and any DBMS. It is the third component (c) where we make
our main contributions. Through this component we facili-
tate a DBMS to use a blockchain network without requiring
to migrate entire data on the blockchain. Verity’s system ar-
chitecture is given in Figure 1. The web application server
is an HTTP based frontend for users to issue SQL queries.
In this interface, we have built our logic of parsing and
intercepting SQL queries issued by an end user, and check-
ing fingerprints of the tuples involved in building the results
of that query against blockchain. REST API is an inter-
face for Hyperledger Composer framework and is used for
querying Hyperledger Fabric for retrieving or adding tuple
fingerprints (ref. Section 2.4).
Note: In Verity, we have used an HTTP based interface
for SQL query processing, but this interface can be in any
other form too. E.g., command line or programmatic (e.g.,
JDBC, ODBC), based on the individual application need.
Using the detailed SQL parsing algorithms given further in
this section, any different interface can be built for achieving
the same functionality.
In Section 3.1 we take a brief overview of the sequence of
actions taken in the Verity framework for any SQL query
issued through it, and then in Section 3.2 we give the de-
tails of handling four main type of SQL queries – SELECT,
INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, and any intermix of them
adhering to the SQL grammar.
3.1 Verity Communication Sequence
Figure 1 shows the interactions between different compo-
nents of Verity for any SQL query. An SQL query initi-
ated using the web application interface ( 1 ) is parsed by
the SQL processor, and it is sent to the DBMS with me-
thodical modifications required to check integrity ( 2 ). The
details of this process are discussed in Section 3.2. DBMS
returns tuples matching this modified query ( 3 ). These
tuples are then verified using the corresponding fingerprints
stored on the blockchain ( 4 , 5 ), which constitutes Ver-
ity’s integrity checking phase. Once the check is successfully
completed, Verity returns results of the original SQL query
to the end user. Thus the integrity checking process is com-
pletely opaque to the end user, and user is notified only
if the integrity check fails. In case of INSERT, UPDATE,
DELETE queries, steps 2 – 5 may have to be executed
twice if these queries have nested SELECT queries inside
them. This process is elaborated further in Section 3.2.
3.2 SQL Parsing
As noted before in Section 2.6, our tamper detection model
is through intercepting SQL queries and their results to
check tuples’ integrity. In this section we elaborate on this
aspect and show methodically how tampering can be de-
tected through subsequent SQL query results using the Ver-
ity framework. We achieve this in the following main steps.
1. Parse the given SQL query using standard SQL grammar.
2. Determine which tuples from the base tables are accessed,
modified, or inserted in the query execution and results.
For this step, Verity maintains information about the
DBMS table schemas with it. Note that consistent with
Verity’s privacy policy, it only stores DBMS schema, and
not actual data or metadata (fingerprints of the tuples).
3. Depending on the type of the query (detailed in Sections
3.2.1–3.2.4) retrieve the tuples accessed or modified by
the query from the base tables in entirety, i.e., with all
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the attributes of those tuples. This step is opaque to the
end user.
4. Generate fingerprints of these tuples as given in Sec-
tion 2.4, and cross-check those fingerprints against Hy-
perledger Fabric, or if tuples are inserted or modified, log
the new fingerprints on Hyperledger.
5. Once the validity of all the base tuples is established, send
back the results of the original user query.
SQL is a rich data manipulation language with a lot of
syntactic sugar. Within the entire range of SQL’s syntactic
features, currently in Verity, we have focused on SELECT,
INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE queries, with any inter-
mix of them. Presently we do not handle queries with out-
erjoins, and IN, ANY, EXISTS, GROUP-BY, HAVING, and aggre-
gation clauses. In the future we plan to extend our parser
to handle most of the SQL syntax.
In Verity, we do not assume any special access to the
DBMS for knowing the tuples processed by an SQL query.
Thus it is imperative to methodically intercept and parse ev-
ery SQL query to get the base tuples for the validity check.
We have achieved this through a LookAhead Left-to-Right
(LALR) bottom up SQL parser. This is similar to a typical
DBMS query parser and plan generator.
Next we present our algorithms to handle the four type
of queries with any intermix and nesting. Algorithm 3.1 is
the general outer wrapper which accepts an SQL query and
invokes appropriate parsing mechanism depending on the
type of the outermost query, i.e., if an INSERT query has
a nested SELECT subquery, the parser calls Algorithm 3.4
meant to process INSERT queries (ref line 7 in Algorithm
3.1).
Algorithm 3.1: Parser(Q)
1 switch type of Q do
2 case SELECT Algorithm 3.2
3 SELECT(Q, φ);
4 case UPDATE Algorithm 3.3
5 UPDATE(Q);
6 case INSERT Algorithm 3.4
7 INSERT(Q);
8 case DELETE Algorithm 3.5
9 DELETE(Q);
3.2.1 SELECT queries
SQL grammar for a SELECT query is given below (com-
plete grammar is not shown for the sake of simplicity).
select_statement: ‘SELECT’ projection-attr ‘FROM’
tables [‘WHERE’ qualifications]
tables: single_table | ‘(’ select_statement ‘)’
| tables ‘,’ tables
An SQL query – with or without joins – can have pro-
jections for only some attributes from the tables, and SQL
grammar allows FROM clause to have a nested SELECT query,
which is treated as a temporary table3. However, recall from
Section 2.4 that the fingerprint of each tuple stored on the
blockchain includes all the attributes in that tuple. Thus
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Since currently we do not handle IN, ANY, EXISTS, GROUP-BY, HAVING
clauses, we assume that the WHERE clause will be devoid of any nested
SELECT statements.
to verify integrity of a tuple, we need to retrieve all the at-
tributes of it from the base tables. One na¨ıve way of doing
it is to retrieve all the tuples in the base tables before query
execution, and check each tuple’s integrity. However, this
incurs following main problems – (a) it misses the advan-
tages of selectivity of a query4, (b) it puts the onus of per-
forming joins of these tuples after verification on the Verity
framework, thus missing the benefits of SQL query optimiza-
tion methods of a native DBMS, (c) it incurs the problem of
“atomicity” of checking the integrity of tuples and returning
query results to the user – commonly known as the Time Of
Check to Time Of Use (TOCTOU) race condition. Hence
we perform this step as follows.
As shown in the grammar, a SELECT query can have
nested subqueries within it as a part of the FROM clause .
Our LALR parser does bottom-up parsing of all the sub-
queries wherein innermost nested SELECT query is parsed
first. For every detected SELECT query, the parser modifies
its projected attributes to include all the attributes of the
respective base tables in the FROM clause. Consider for in-
stance, the following query on tables t1, t2, t3 with attributes
(x, y, a), (a, s, b), (c, d, b) respectively stored in that order.
SELECT t1.a, t2.b, t3.c
FROM t1, t2, t3
WHERE t1.a=t2.a AND t2.b=t3.b
This query has two joins over three tables, t1, t2, t3, and
is projecting out only three out of total nine attributes in
three tables. For Verity’s integrity check however, we need
to have all the attributes of the tuples from t1, t2, t3 that are
part of the join results. Thus Verity’s SQL parser internally
rewrites this query as follows.
SELECT t1.x, t1.y, t1.a, t2.a, t2.s,
t2.b, t3.c, t3.d, t3.b
FROM t1, t2, t3
WHERE t1.a=t2.a AND t2.b=t3.b
Now consider the same query rewritten in a different syn-
tax using a nested SELECT clause as given below.
SELECT t1.a, r1.b, t3.c
FROM t1, (SELECT a, b FROM t2) AS r1, t3
WHERE t1.a=r1.a AND r1.b=t3.b
This query is intercepted and rewritten by Verity as:
SELECT t1.x, t1.y, t1.a,
r1.a, r1.s, r1.b,
t3.c, t3,d, t3,b
FROM t1, (SELECT a, s, b FROM t2) AS r1, t3
WHERE t1.a=r1.a AND r1.b=t3.b
Algorithm 3.2 shows programmatic way of doing this pro-
cedure for a SELECT query having any level of nesting. At
the beginning Algorithm 3.2 receives the original user query
Q, with Qparent empty. The original query is stored for
later reference as Qorig (line 2). If the query has nested
SELECT queries, then they are parsed recursively. Every
time SELECT is invoked on a nested query, the outer SE-
LECT query is sent as Qparent. Note here that since this is a
bottom-up parser, the outermost query does not get parsed
4
Selectivity of a query is high if it accesses only few tuples, and vice
versa.
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Algorithm 3.2: SELECT(Q, Qparent)
// Qparent is empty for the outermost query
1 if Qparent == φ then
2 Qorig ← Q;
3 if Q has nested SELECT queries then
// Lookup only one level lower SELECT
queries
4 foreach Q’ in next level SELECT queries do
// Call SELECT recursively on the
subqueries with the parent query
5 SELECT(Q’, Q);
// In place projected attr change
6 Q ← ChangeProjection(Q);
7 if Qparent == φ then
// table list can be populated recursively
while parsing, and these can include
temporary tables as shown in our example
8 table list ← tables in Q;
9 ResQ ← DB Exec(Q);
10 foreach T in table list do
// Project out only attributes of table T
from the whole result row
11 tuples ← TuplesOf(ResQ, T);
12 for r ∈ tuples do
13 RowIDr,T = h(PrimaryKeyr.T );
14 fingerprintr = h(RowID.r);
15 Verify fingerprint against Hyperledger;
// Get results with original projection
attributes
16 ResQorig ← ProjectResults(ResQ, Qorig);
17 return ResQorig ;
or processed until all the inner queries are done parsing (lines
3–5).
When the query has no more nested subqueries, we change
the projected attributes in the current query to include all
the attributes of all the base tables in that query (line 6).
Recall that we store the DBMS schema with Verity to be
able to do this. After the innermost subquery is parsed,
recursion unwinds, and all the parent queries are processed
to change projected attributes from their respective base
tables. When the recursion ends, we are back to the out-
ermost query. Here we get a new Q different from Qorig
which projects out all the attributes in the accessed base ta-
bles. Then this query Q is executed on the DBMS (line 9).
table list contains all the base tables accessed in the query,
including any subqueries. table list is populated while the
queries are parsed recursively in a bottom-up manner. This
step is not shown explicitly in the algorithm for simplicity
of presentation.
The results returned by this modified Q are cached in
ResQ. Note that this is a temporary caching of the re-
sults, and Verity does not store ResQ persistently in any
manner. Then for each unique base table in the query, we
project out tuples of only that table from ResQ by using
the DBMS schema stored in Verity, and verify the tuple
fingerprint against Hyperledger Fabric (lines 10–15). Once
this verification is done, we project out the attributes from
ResQ according to the original query Qorig, and generate
the results of the original user query (line 16).
3.2.2 UPDATE queries
The grammar for UPDATE queries is as given below.
update_statement: ‘UPDATE’ single_table ‘SET’
set_clauses [‘WHERE’ qualifications]
set_clauses: set_clause ‘,’ set_clauses
| set_clause
set_clause: identifier ‘=’ expression
| identifier ‘=’ ‘(’ select_statement ‘)’
An UPDATE query can have nested SELECT queries as a
part of the SET clause. For instance consider the following
UPDATE query.
UPDATE T1 SET T1.a =
(SELECT a FROM T2 WHERE T2.key=1234)
WHERE T1.b = 4567
In this query whichever row of T1 has “b” column with
value 4567, its respective “a” column is updated with a value
of “a” from T2 such that T2.key in the same row has value
1234. Note that in this query the nested SELECT query
must always return a unique single value, and not a list of
values (as that will violate the arithmetic of “=” operator).
Here Verity uses the same principle of modifying the query
along with its nested queries to get – (a) the entire tuples
that are going to provide update values, (b) old tuples that
are going to get updated. It first checks the fingerprints of all
these rows, generates new fingerprints for the updated rows,
stores them on Hyperledger, and then sends the updated
rows to the DBMS. This is achieved methodically using Al-
gorithm 3.3. Its functioning is explained briefly as follows.
Algorithm 3.3: UPDATE(Q)
1 rows[] ← φ;
2 if SET clause has SELECT queries then
3 foreach SELECT query Q’ do
// Invoke Algorithm 3.2
4 rows[Q’] ← SELECT(Q’, φ); // verify
fingerprints
5 T ← get table to be updated from Q;
6 qualifications ← get WHERE clause of Q;
7 Q” ← “SELECT * FROM T WHERE qualifications”;
8 old rows ← DB Exec(Q”);
9 Check fingerprint of the old rows;
10 updated rows ← Construct(Q, rows, old rows);
11 foreach r ∈ updated rows do
12 RowIDr,T = h(PrimaryKeyr.T );
13 fingerprintr = h(RowID.r);
14 Send update to Hyperledger;
15 Send individual row update to SQLite;
If the SET clause of UPDATE query has nested SELECT
queries, then for each such SELECT query Q′, we invoke
Algorithm 3.2 for SELECT to get the tuples used in UP-
DATE. Note that Algorithm 3.2 also methodically checks
the integrity of the tuples accessed by this SELECT query,
thus ensuring that the tuples used for an update have not
been tampered. The SET clause can have multiple such SE-
LECT queries for each set condition. The results returned
for each SELECT query Q′ are stored separately as rows[Q’]
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(lines 2–4). Then if there is a WHERE clause in the original
UPDATE query, e.g., WHERE T1.b = 4567 of the example
query given above, we retrieve old tuples from table T that
will get updated (lines 5–8).
We check the fingerprints of these tuples against Hyper-
ledger (line 9). Next we construct the new tuples that will
be in the table after the update (line 10), create their finger-
prints, and send them to Hyperledger. Note that since we
have completely deconstructed the original UPDATE query
and have individual updated tuples, we simply send these
individual tuples to the DBMS than the original UPDATE
query Q (lines 11–15).
3.2.3 INSERT queries
SQL grammar for an INSERT query is as given below.
insert_statement: ‘INSERT INTO’ single_table
‘(’ id_list ‘)’ ‘VALUES’ ‘(’ expr_list ‘)’
| ‘INSERT INTO’ single_table
‘(’ id_list ‘)’ select_statement
Algorithm 3.4: INSERT(Q)
1 T ← get table to be inserted in from Q;
2 if Q has nested SELECTs then
3 Q′ ← nested SELECT query;
// Invoke Algorithm 3.2 and verify tuples
4 rows ← SELECT(Q′, φ)
5 else
6 rows ← Populate rows from Q;
7 for r ∈ rows do
8 RowIDr,T = h(PrimaryKeyr.T );
9 fingerprintr = h(RowID.r);
10 Insert fingerprint in Hyperledger;
11 Insert tuple in SQLite;
Like UPDATE, INSERT query too can have nested SE-
LECT statements in it. This is when the tuples are inserted
by constructing them out of a results of another SELECT
query. We have given a methodical way of handling an IN-
SERT query in Algorithm 3.4. If the INSERT query has a
nested SELECT, we invoke Algorithm 3.2, verify the tuples
accessed by this SELECT query, done as a part of Algorithm
3.2, and get the tuples to be inserted (lines 2–4 in Algorithm
3.4). Else tuples are populated from the original query Q
(line 6). For each new tuple to be inserted, we generate
its fingerprint and store it on Hyperledger. Like UPDATE
queries, here too we deconstruct the INSERT query com-
pletely to generate each new tuple, and thus we send these
individual tuples to the DBMS for insertion than executing
the original INSERT query (lines 7–11).
3.2.4 DELETE queries
DELETE query’s grammar is as given below.
delete_statement: ‘DELETE FROM’ single_table
[‘WHERE’ qualifications]
Processing of a DELETE query is very similar to an IN-
SERT query. DELETE query does not contain any nested
SELECT query. This is because currently we do not process
IN, ANY, EXISTS, GROUP-BY, HAVING clauses, which may
in turn contain nested SELECTs as a part of the WHERE
qualifications. Thus processing of DELETE queries just
involves fetching the tuples to be deleted, verifying their
fingerprints before deletion, marking their fingerprints as
deleted on Hyperledger, and then deleting them from DBMS.
Algorithm 3.5 shows this procedure.
Algorithm 3.5: DELETE(Q)
1 T ← get table to be deleted from Q;
2 qualifications ← get WHERE clause of Q;
3 Q′ ← “SELECT * FROM T WHERE qualifications”;
// Verify rows to be deleted first
4 rows ← SELECT(Q’, φ);
5 for r ∈ rows do
6 RowIDr,T = h(PrimaryKeyr.T );
7 fingerprintr = h(RowID.r);
8 Mark fingerprint deleted on Hyperledger;
9 Delete r from SQLite;
4. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this section we discuss additional factors for future en-
hancements in Verity.
4.1 Thwarting SQL Injection Attack
In Section 3.2, we elaborated on our main contribution,
i.e., our way of intercepting SQL queries using the SQL
grammar, methodically deconstructing each nested SQL query,
and verifying the integrity of the tuples returned by that
query. A positive side effect of this is – Verity’s SQL parser
can act as an intermediary that can thwart SQL injection
attacks. In the future, Verity’s SQL parser can also be em-
powered with checks for malicious SQL statements.
4.2 ACID Properties
ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) prop-
erties make the core of any mature DBMS. Verity is a data-
less framework between a blockchain and a DBMS (it does
not store any data or metadata with itself), thus durabil-
ity does not apply to Verity. However, queries that modify
the tuples in DBMS are processed via Verity, and thus need
atomicity, consistency, and isolation properties of transac-
tion management. As given in Section 3.2, Verity maintains
information about the schema of the database. Using that,
in the future, we plan to have an elaborate method to han-
dle concurrent SQL queries that are modifying tuple val-
ues. DBMS transaction management is a well-studied topic
[49], and borrowing the same concepts of transaction man-
agement and serializability, we can handle concurrent SQL
queries modifying the tuples using the DBMS schema.
4.3 Optimizations
Currently the Verity SQL parser is single-threaded, pro-
cesses one query at a time, and makes blockchain finger-
print lookup one tuple at a time for that query. Also for
any transactional queries (queries that modify tuples), to
maintain atomicity, consistency, and isolation (ACI proper-
ties) Verity immediately pushes them on Hyperledger. The
typical block creation process is time consuming, and Hy-
perledger Composer adds further overheads [33]. This is the
reason for our relatively higher total query execution times
as shown in Table 2, Figure 2, and our supplementary report
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[52]. In the future we will make tuple fingerprint lookups on
Hyperledger in parallel to improve overall query processing
time, and investigate into the throughput of Hyperledger
Fabric and Composer framework. These optimizations will
go hand-in-hand with the previousely mentioned aspects in
Section 4.2.
SQL language is a well-researched topic with a rich set
of literature for manipulating and rewriting SQL queries for
better performance. In the current Verity framework, we
have adopted a way of projecting out all the columns of
the tables in a nested SELECT query for integrity checking.
This is due to the way tuple fingerprints are stored on the
blockchain. However in the future, we can have more intel-
ligent logic based on the structure of the query, for parsing
and tuple checking, which can reduce the performance over-
head and blockchain lookup time.
4.4 Indexes, Views on Base Tables
Indexes and views on tables are common in modern DBMS.
The use of indexes or views in query execution is most times
opaque to the end user and is decided internally by the
DBMS query optimization method. Thus in an insider at-
tack, it is possible that the attacker modifies tuples in the
base tables of a DBMS, but indexes or views created on
them are not updated. In such a case, the database itself is
in inconsistent state. Since Verity considers DBMS to be an
independent entity, we assume that these consistency checks
across base tables and their indexes or views will be done
by the DBMS. However, we want to highlight that the goal
of Verity is to preclude illegitimately tampered tuples from
being used in subsequent SQL queries, and avoid the cas-
cade effect in important decisions based on them, e.g., aca-
demic grades or financial entities. Verity allows any tuples
retrieved from DBMS that pass the integrity check against
blockchain fingerprints. In case of any illegitimate modifi-
cations found in tuples, it flags them, and prevents sending
the results of the query.
4.5 Special Case of Illegitimate Delete
In Section 3.2.4, we outlined our procedure for handling a
DELETE query that comes through the Verity framework.
However, an insider attack containing illegitimate tuple dele-
tions presents a different challenge for detecting it purely
through the subsequent SQL queries and their results. If
an inside attacker deletes tuples from DBMS (and erases
any logs relating to that too), the respective tuples never
get selected as a part of any subsequent SQL queries, never
show up in Verity framework for checking against blockchain
fingerprints, and thus deletion does not get detected.
We propose the following solution for this. Recall from
Section 2.5, that along with the fingerprint of each tuple,
we also store the total number of tuples in a table on the
blockchain. One solution for detecting illegitimate delete is
to periodically run SELECT count(*) FROM T query for each
table T in the DBMS, and cross verify the number of tu-
ples returned with the tuple count stored on the blockchain.
However, this check can be fooled with an illegitimate delete
followed by a dummy (illegitimate) insert in the same table.
To handle this case, Verity framework can periodically run
SELECT * FROM T query for every table T, and check every
tuple’s fingerprint against that stored on the blockchain.
The dummy tuple’s fingerprint will not be found on the
blockchain, and an alert will be raised for tampering of tu-
ples.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present our experiments using Verity.
5.1 Computation Setup
As described before in Section 3, we use Hyperledger Fab-
ric v1.1 as the blockchain network, and Hyperledger Com-
poser v0.19.18 REST API to write the chaincodes (for in-
teracting with Hyperledger Fabric). Hyperledger Fabric was
deployed using docker version 18.09.0, build 4d60db4. We
wrote our SQL parser using Python v3.5.2 programming lan-
guage, and used SQLite v3.11.0 as the underlying DBMS.
For testing, we deployed this setup on two Asus 2U servers
with Intel C602-A chipset, Intel Core Xeon E5-2620 proces-
sor, 16GB RAM and 1TB SATA Hard disk running Ubuntu
16.04.01 with Linux 4.4.0-62-generic kernel. We used one
machine to deploy Hyperledger Fabric, and used another to
parse the queries and send requests to Hyperledger. The
machines were networked together using a CAT5 LAN ca-
ble. .
5.2 Dataset and SQL Queries
We used the TPC-H [21] synthetic relational data gener-
ator in our experiments, and generated four datasets using
scaling factors 0.001, 0.002, 0.005, and 0.01. Note that,
although we have used TPC-H, our goal in Verity frame-
work is not to benchmark SQLite or Hyperledger Fabric,
but to demonstrate functioning of Verity under variety of
SQL queries. Table 1 shows the number of tuples in each
table within these datasets corresponding to each scaling
factor.
Using the 22 queries from TPC-H suite as guidelines, we
generated 43 queries of varying complexity and intermix of
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE5. All the 43
queries are given in Appendix A. In summary – we used 27
SELECT queries having nested subqueries as well as joins,
6 INSERT, 5 UPDATE, and 5 DELETE queries, simple as
well as with nested SELECT statements within them. Note
that the queries have varying levels of complexity and nested
structures within them.
Number of tuples
Scale Factors 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01
Customer 150 300 750 1500
Lineitem 6005 11957 30201 60175
Nation 25 25 25 25
Orders 1500 3000 7500 15000
Part 200 400 1000 2000
Patsupp 700 1500 3900 8000
Region 5 5 5 5
Supplier 10 20 50 100
Total 8595 17207 43431 86805
Table 1: Number of tuples in each table of the TPC-H
dataset
5.3 Performance Metrics
For experiments we used the following metrics:
5TPC-H suite did not have many update queries.
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Figure 2: Plots of relation between processing time vs number of effective tuples processed as per our parsing method (see
Section 3.2) for 4 TPC-H scaling factors, on 43 queries as given in Appendix A.
1. TPC-H scaling factor, 0.001, 0.002, 0.005, 0.01.
2. Time taken for end-to-end execution of each query, i.e.,
wall-time, averaged over 5 runs.
3. Time taken for the execution of SQL queries on SQLite
(Section 3.2 elaborates how the queries are executed).
4. Time taken for Hyperledger Fabric lookup of finger-
prints of the tuples in the query results (Section 3.2
describes how tuples are extracted for lookup from the
SQL query results).
5. Number of tuples accessed, inserted, or modified by a
query – in case of an INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
query with nested SELECT subquery, this number
includes the tuples accessed by the nested SELECT
query as well as the ones modified by the INSERT,
UPDATE, or DELETE query.
5.4 Analysis of the Results
We ran 43 queries on the data generated by each TPC-
H scaling factor separately, and noted the end-to-end wall
time, time taken to run the queries on SQLite, and time
taken by Hyperledger Fabric averaged over 5 runs. We ob-
served that the time taken for running the queries on SQLite
was very negligible compared to the Hyperledger lookup.
Hence we plotted the end-to-end runtime of the 43 queries
against the total number of tuples affected or accessed in
each query for each scaling factor. Figure 2 shows these
plots.
From the plots in Figure 2, we can clearly see a linear re-
lationship between the number of tuples affected by a query
and total query runtime. Recall from our architecture given
in Section 3, that Verity acts only as a framework facilitat-
ing the use of a blockchain network with an SQL DBMS. As
given in Section 2.4, we store only 256 bit fixed-length finger-
print of each tuple on the blockchain network. Thus lookup
overhead per tuple remains constant, and scales linearly as
per total number of tuples.
For an interested reader, we have also given the exact ex-
ecution times for each query, for each scaling factor in our
supplementary report at [52]. In Table 2, we present the
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Q
No.
Q
Type
Is
nested
query?
#
Ta-
bles
# Tu-
ples
End-to-
end
time
Time
per
tu-
ple
Scaling Factor = 0.001
2 S ✗ 1 5 0.52 0.10
11 U(S) ✓ 3 3 2.68 0.89
18 I ✗ 1 5 12.12 2.42
19 U ✗ 1 6 14.18 2.36
26 D ✗ 1 12 29.37 2.45
40 S(S) ✓ 3 2504 249.08 0.10
Scaling Factor = 0.002
2 S ✗ 1 5 0.48 0.10
11 U(S) ✓ 3 3 2.55 0.85
18 I ✗ 1 5 11.84 2.37
19 U ✗ 1 6 13.87 2.31
26 D ✗ 1 12 28.80 2.40
40 S(S) ✓ 3 5040 416.84 0.08
Scaling Factor = 0.005
2 S ✗ 1 5 0.45 0.09
11 U(S) ✓ 3 3 2.59 0.86
18 I ✗ 1 5 11.97 2.39
19 U ✗ 1 6 13.96 2.33
26 D ✗ 1 12 29.14 2.43
40 S(S) ✓ 3 12632 1,037.30 0.08
Scaling Factor = 0.01
2 S ✗ 1 5 0.52 0.10
11 U(S) ✓ 3 3 2.66 0.89
18 I ✗ 1 5 12.25 2.45
19 U ✗ 1 6 14.08 2.35
26 D ✗ 1 12 29.30 2.44
40 S(S) ✓ 3 25314 2,146.84 0.08
Table 2: Execution stats of 6 representative queries from full
report [52]. “QNo.” as per list in Appendix A. “# Tables”
– tables accessed by the query, “# Tuples” – total number
of tuples accessed/verified. S, I, U, D stands for SELECT,
INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE respectively, letter in bracket
shows type of nested query.
execution statistics for 6 representative queries from this re-
port of varying types (S, I, U, D), complexity, and nesting
structure for quick insights into the results. From this de-
tailed analysis, it can be observed that for a SELECT query,
typical Hyperledger lookup time is 0.08–0.1 second per tu-
ple, and for queries requiring modification of tuples, such
as INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, this time is about 0.8–2.5
seconds per tuple. The higher time for the queries requiring
modifications in the tuples is due to the peer-consensus pro-
tocol that needs to add a fingerprint, or adjust the number
of tuples per table on the Hyperledger network (ref. Sections
2.4, 2.5).
From these results, one may feel that use of blockchains
along with a DBMS incurs overheads that seem undesirable
for high-performance throughput. However, as discussed be-
fore in the text of this paper, in the present work, our aim is
to – (a) establish a formalism for handling a rich set of com-
plex SQL queries, (b) without migrating entire DBMS data
on a blockchain, (c) thereby maintaining privacy, (d) while
using the tamper-resistance properties of a blockchain to de-
tect an insider attack. We have achieved this by intercepting
SQL queries and their resulting tuples, by treating both the
blockchain as well as DBMS as black-boxes. Verity itself
does not do any SQL query optimization, or data or meta-
data caching and indexing. Thus the overall throughput
of the Verity framework can be improved by investigating
the blockchain throughput improvement methods (which is
not the focus of our present work). Nevertheless, in Section
4.3 we have discussed the performance optimizations we in-
tend to do in the Verity framework through parallelizing the
blockchain lookups, and investigating SQL query structures.
6. RELATED WORK
We classify related work broadly into categories given in
the following subsections.
6.1 Blockchains and DBMS
As discussed briefly in Section 1, current efforts for using
blockchain technology for DBMS mainly offer solutions for
integrating blockchain functionalities, such as peer-consensus
protocol and decentralized storage into native DBMS. Big-
chainDB [9] integrates Tendermint [20, 44] with MongoDB
[17]. It supports only decentralized blockchain based data
management eco-system, and only MongoDB’s querying in-
terface. LedgerDB [16] supports high transaction through-
put, but provides only a single table, and does not support
various SQL features. ChainDB by Bitpay Inc [10] focuses
on bitcoin transactions, than providing a general purpose
DBMS solution. EthernityDB [39] integrates a DBMS func-
tionality into an Ethereum blockchain, by keeping all the
data on the chain, and by mapping DBMS functionalities
onto Ethereum smart contracts.
In most of these solutions the data from native DBMS has
to be migrated entirely onto a new blockchain powered sys-
tem. Solutions such as BigchainDB, LedgerDB, or ChainDB
do not provide rich SQL interface. In comparison to them,
our goal in Verity is to use blockchain functionality of non-
repudiation with a native DBMS without complete migra-
tion of the data, and by just intercepting the SQL queries
and their results for insider attack detection. In Verity, we
store only fingerprints of the tuples on a blockchain, thus
maintaining data privacy.
6.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) mainly use machine
learning techniques to model legitimate or illegitimate be-
haviour to detect an anomaly. Their performance heavily
relies on the training data used for modelling user behaviour
[23, 24, 43, 47, 50]. An interested reader can refer to a more
comprehensive survey given in [40].
IDSs specific for DBMS model access patterns of DBMS
users and learn data dependencies among data items. DEMIDS
(DEtection of MIsuse in Database System) [30] analyzes ac-
cess patterns of users by using audit logs, builds user pro-
files, and use these to detect unusual behaviour. RBAC
(Role Based Access Control) [27] improves upon DEMIDS
by creating profiles for each role instead of individual user
and associating users with roles, which enables them to han-
dle a large number of database users. They use Na¨ıve Bayes
Classifier. Wu et al [54] do role profiling with role hier-
archies. Another technique mines the dependencies among
data items [41], to detect what set of data items are usually
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accessed before a particular data is changed. Any transac-
tions not compliant with these pre-built models are treated
as malicious. WDDRM (Weighted Data Dependency Rule
Miner) [51] improves upon this technique by associating
weight to an attribute based on the sensitivity of the data
stored in that attribute. There are other techniques that use
time signatures [45, 38] and Hidden Markov Models [26].
6.3 Mitigation and Prevention Techniques
In [53], Vance et al propose to make the user account-
able for policy violation, and in [28], Bishop et al propose
attribute-based group access control (ABGAC) policies to
act as a deterrent. Wu et al [55] propose the concept of
“active data leak prevention” where they use an encrypted
secure data container (SDC) to ensure that only authorized
users are able to access the data in a trusted environment.
In [48], Pramanik et al propose policies that prohibit mod-
ification of a sensitive file, while another “inappropriate”
file is open. Chagarlamudi at al [29] propose sequential
access checking technique that prevents execution of ma-
licious user tasks by using PetriNets. Confidentiality via
camouflage performs deterministic numerical interval-based
responses of ad-hoc queries to a DBMS [36, 34, 35].
Along with these techniques, access control policies are
used to prevent insider attacks. In [42], they integrate se-
curity policy mechanism in the system. Other techniques
augment access control with role based policies, trustwor-
thiness of the users, and risk assessment of the roles [32, 25].
In Cyber Deception [22], they propose a technique based on
software defined networks (SDN) to defend the network with
extensive scrutiny of the network.
In summary, Verity’s approach to insider attack detec-
tion is significantly different from IDS, or previously pro-
posed prevention and mitigation techniques. In Verity, we
use a technique to detect any tuple with illegitimate modifi-
cations, that is accessed in subsequent SQL queries, through
fingerprint checks against Hyperledger Fabric. At the time
of bootstrapping, Verity stores fingerprints of the tuples on
Hyperledger, but that does not involve any machine learn-
ing of the system6. Also through Verity, one can use any
blockchain network with any SQL DBMS by using their re-
spective interfaces, and peer consensus protocols.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose Verity – a framework to use
blockchains to detect an insider attack or data tampering
in a DBMS. We have achieved this by storing fingerprints
of DBMS tuples on a blockchain (Section 2.4), intercepting
SQL queries (Section 3.2), and verifying validity of the tu-
ples accessed or affected by these queries against the blockchain
fingerprints. For any queries modifying the data that are
processed through Verity, it can attribute the changes to the
corresponding owner. Verity has some latency due to its tu-
ple integrity checks against blockchain for each query. How-
ever, we trust that in systems where integrity of the DBMS
tuples is important from the point of critical decisions based
on them, this latency can be tolerated instead of compro-
mising the integrity of the data. Nevertheless, we have dis-
cussed ways of improving throughput in Section 4.3. Ver-
ity framework facilitates use of blockchain’s non-repudiation
6Special case of illegitimate deletion of tuples is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5.
along with a native SQL DBMS without the need of data
migration or adoption of different query interface. Verity
framework does not store any data or metadata within itself
persistently. This makes Verity quickly adoptable in critical
applications requiring data integrity, provided some latency
can be tolerated. We have implemented Verity for an aca-
demic grade management system and our current solution
works very well there as the database does not have very
high transaction rate and can tolerate delays caused by the
intervention of the blockchain.
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Appendices
A. SQL QUERIES
Q1: SELECT o year, nation, ( sum (volume) as mkt share)
from (( select (o orderdate as o year), ((l extendedprice *
(1 - l discount)) as volume), (n2.n name as nation) from
part, supplier, lineitem, orders, customer, (nation as n1),
(nation as n2), region where p partkey = l partkey and
s suppkey = l suppkey and l orderkey = o orderkey and
o custkey = c custkey and c nationkey = n1.n nationkey
and n1.n regionkey = r regionkey and r name = “asia” and
s nationkey = n2.n nationkey and o orderdate > ’1995-01-
01’ and o orderdate< ‘1996-12-31’ and p type = ‘large plated
tin’ ) as all nations);
Q2: SELECT * from region;
Q3: SELECT * from supplier;
Q4: SELECT * from nation;
Q5: UPDATE customer set c name = “sjadfd”, c address
= “kafawehrnj”, c phone=“7894561265”, c acctbal = 22,
c mktsegment = “klasjfaw”, c comment=“laksfnwe” where
c custkey = 91639739;
Q6: INSERT into nation (n nationkey, n name, n regionkey,
n comment) values ( 93793619 ,“algeria”, 123454556741 ,“hag-
gle detect slyly agai”);
Q7: INSERT into customer ( c custkey , c name , c address
, c nationkey , c phone , c acctbal ,c mktsegment, c comment
) values (91639739 , “loren”, “lipsum”, 93793619 , “1234”,
234, “muspil”, “nerol”);
Q8: INSERT into region (r regionkey, r name, r comment)
values (123454556741, “sambhal”, “jhfasfhf kajhfawerb idauh-
fwerbe aksfhnwejrb”);
Q9: DELETE from nation where n nationkey = 93793619;
Q10: DELETE from region where r regionkey = 123454556741;
Q11: UPDATE supplier set s nationkey = (select c nationkey
from customer where c custkey= 91639739), s phone = (
select c phone from customer where c custkey= 91639739),
s comment =“askdenrjuhereu”, s acctbal = 2 + 10 where
s suppkey = 91639739 +1000;
Q12: SELECT s acctbal, s name, n name, p partkey, p mfgr,
s address, s phone, s comment from part, supplier, part-
supp, nation, region where p partkey = ps partkey and s suppkey
= ps suppkey and p size = 1 and s nationkey = n nationkey
and n regionkey = r regionkey and r name = “africa”;
Q13: SELECT n name, (sum(l extendedprice * (1 - l discount))
as revenue) from customer, orders, lineitem, supplier, na-
tion, region where c custkey = o custkey and l orderkey =
o orderkey and l suppkey = s suppkey and c nationkey =
s nationkey and s nationkey = n nationkey and n regionkey
= r regionkey and r name = “asia” and o orderdate >=
“1995-03-09” and o orderdate < “1996-03-09”;
Q14: SELECT supp nation, cust nation, l shipdate, (sum
(volume) as revenue) from (( select (n1.n name as supp nation),
( n2.n name as cust nation), l shipdate, ((l extendedprice *
(1 - l discount)) as volume) from supplier, lineitem, orders,
customer, (nation as n1), (nation as n2) where s suppkey
= l suppkey and o orderkey = l orderkey and c custkey =
o custkey and s nationkey = n1.n nationkey and c nationkey
= n2.n nationkey and ( (n1.n name = “india” and n2.n name
= “united states”) or (n1.n name = “united states” and
n2.n name = “india”) ) and l shipdate > ‘1995-01-01’ and
l shipdate < ‘1996-12-31’ ) as shipping);
Q15: SELECT (sum(l extendedprice * l discount) as rev-
enue) from lineitem where l shipdate >= “1994-04-15” and
l shipdate < “1995-04-15” and l discount > 0.04 - 0.01 and
l discount < 0.04 + 0.01 and l quantity < 20 ;
Q16: SELECT o orderpriority, (count(*) as order count)
from orders where o orderdate>= “1995-03-09” and o orderdate
< “1995-06-09”;
Q17: SELECT l shipmode, o orderpriority from orders, lineitem
where o orderkey = l orderkey and (l shipmode = “ship” or
l shipmode = “air”) and l commitdate < l receiptdate and
l shipdate < l commitdate and l receiptdate >= “1995-01-
01” and l receiptdate < “1996-01-01”;
Q18: INSERT into customer ( c custkey , c name , c address
, c nationkey , c phone , c acctbal ,c mktsegment, c comment)
values (91639738 , “sumpil”, “renol”, 93793619 , “9242”,
234, “pilsum”, “rolen”) , ( 91639737 , “abc”, “def”, 93793619
, “1234”, 234, “yhbdsra”, “afgsdf”), (96244913, “pkjhbc”,
“mnhgre”, 93793619 , “9543”, 234, “qaxcvf”, “iomnbgf”),
( 96244914, “yuthgbvfg”, “qgytrevd”, 93793619 , “75345”,
234, “liyhvdrt”, “qfgkdyv”), (96244915, “ramnabfubt”,
“njhiyfcvh”, 93793619 , “126789”, 234, “summinhsve”,
“qgjorutbbs”);
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Q19: UPDATE customer set c name=“ashdehhrbeki” where
c name = “sjadfd”;
Q20: UPDATE customer set c name = “sjadfd”, c address
= “asndkwewhrwoer”, c phone = “3245456458”, c acctbal=22
,c mktsegment = “ajshuejre”, c comment = “asjhdeke” where
c nationkey = 93793619;
Q21: DELETE from customer where c nationkey = 93793619;
Q22: INSERT into supplier (s suppkey, s name, s address,
s nationkey, s phone, s acctbal, s comment) select ( c custkey
+ 1000 ), c name, c address, c nationkey, c phone, c acctbal,
c comment from customer where c nationkey = 93793619;
Q23: SELECT l orderkey, (sum ( l extendedprice) as rev-
enue), o orderdate, o shippriority from customer, orders,
lineitem where c mktsegment = “automobile” and c custkey
= o custkey and l orderkey = o orderkey and o orderdate <
“1995-03-09” and l shipdate > “1995-03-09”;
Q24: SELECT (sum ( l extendedprice * (1 - l discount ))
as promo revenue) from lineitem, part where l partkey =
p partkey and l shipdate >= “1995-01-01” and l shipdate
< “1995-02-01”;
Q25: SELECT * from customer;
Q26: DELETE from supplier where s nationkey = 93793619;
Q27: SELECT p brand, p type, p size, (count ( ps suppkey
) as supplier cnt ) from partsupp, part where p partkey =
ps partkey and p brand <> ‘brand#34’ and p type not like
‘medium brushed brass’ and ( p size = 22 or p size = 47 or
p size = 30 or p size = 29 or p size = 11 or p size = 37 or
p size = 42 or p size = 34 or p size = 40 );
Q28: SELECT * from part;
Q29: SELECT ps partkey, (sum(ps supplycost * ps availqty)
as value) from partsupp, supplier, nation where ps suppkey
= s suppkey and s nationkey = n nationkey and n name =
“india”;
Q30: SELECT c custkey, c name, (sum ( l extendedprice *
(1 - l discount)) as revenue), c acctbal, n name, c address,
c phone, c comment from customer, orders, lineitem, nation
where c custkey = o custkey and l orderkey = o orderkey
and o orderdate >= “1995-01-01” and o orderdate < “1995-
04-01” and l returnflag = ‘r’ and c nationkey = n nationkey;
Q31: UPDATE supplier set s acctbal = (select sum(c custkey)
from (customer as c), (nation as n) where c.c nationkey
= n.n nationkey), s phone = ( select c phone from cus-
tomer where c custkey= 91639738), s comment = “asdher-
bejhrbeh” where s suppkey = 100001;
Q32: SELECT s suppkey, n name, s name from supplier,
nation where supplier.s nationkey = nation.n nationkey;
Q33: SELECT s suppkey, n name, s name from (( select
* from supplier ) as sup ), nation where sup.s nationkey =
nation.n nationkey;
Q34: SELECT s suppkey, s name, s address, s phone, to-
tal revenue from supplier, (( select ( l suppkey), (max (
l extendedprice * (1 - l discount)) as total revenue) from
lineitem where l shipdate >= “1995-01-01” and l shipdate
< “1995-04-01”) as sup) where s suppkey = sup.l suppkey;
Q35: SELECT sn.s name, rn.r name from (( select n name,
s name from (supplier as sup ), nation where sup.s nationkey
= nation.n nationkey) as sn), (( select n name, r name from
( region as reg ), nation where reg.r regionkey = nation.n regionkey
) as rn ) where sn.n name = rn.n name;
Q36: SELECT * from partsupp;
Q37: SELECT * from orders;
Q38: SELECT nation, o year, (sum (amount) as sum profit)
from (( select ( n name as nation), (o orderdate as o year),
((( l extendedprice * (1 - l discount )) - ( ps supplycost
* l quantity )) as amount ) from part, supplier, lineitem,
partsupp, orders, nation where s suppkey = l suppkey and
ps suppkey = l suppkey and ps partkey = l partkey and
p partkey = l partkey and o orderkey = l orderkey and s nationkey
= n nationkey and p name like ‘%ab%’ ) as profit);
Q39: SELECT l returnflag, l linestatus, (sum (l quantity)
as sum qty), (sum (l extendedprice) as sum base price), (avg
(l quantity) as avg qty), (avg (l extendedprice) as avg price),
(avg (l discount) as avg disc) from lineitem where l quantity
<= 20;
Q40: SELECT c orders.c custkey, (count(*) as custdist)
from (( select c custkey, o orderkey from customer, orders
where c custkey = o custkey and o comment not like ‘%fi%al%’
) as c orders); select * from customer;
Q41: DELETE from supplier where s suppkey > 20000;
Q42: INSERT into supplier ( s suppkey, s name, s address,
s nationkey, s phone, s acctbal, s comment ) select ( c custkey
+ 100000 ), n name, c address, c nationkey, c phone, c acctbal,
c comment from ( customer as c), ( nation as n ) where
c.c nationkey = n.n nationkey ;
Q43: SELECT * from lineitem;
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